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What a Difference a Day Makes*
Kim Martin Lewis
MS. LEWIS: Thank you. I am a bankruptcy and restructuring law-
yer, so I never envisioned ever being before the United States Su-
preme Court. This case started out in February 2001 when I got a
phone call from my partner in Lexington, Kentucky. And he said, "I
have a friend that has an involuntary bankruptcy commenced against
him, and he is the former governor of Kentucky. I need you to come
down here and talk to him because there are some issues with the
corporation. The bank wants to talk to the corporation."
So I went down the very next day and interviewed and got the job
to represent the corporation, which was Wallace Bookstores. Wallace
Bookstores was owned by the former governor of Kentucky, and an
involuntary bankruptcy was commenced against the former governor
by a number of people. One of them was Dave Thomas, the former
owner of Wendy's.
It started out as a difficult case from a bankruptcy/restructuring
standpoint, and we spent 20-hour days dealing with the bank, and we
spent lots of those days with FBI investigations and spent lots of days
with having to get rid of the former governor as the CEO of the com-
pany and his sons, et cetera. Needless to say, it was a very difficult
case to start with but, again, I never envisioned that it might result in a
case before the United States Supreme Court.
The business itself was a company that operated college book stores
throughout the United States. And so we came into the case, realized
that there wasn't enough cash to operate the company, and that we
would have to quickly sell the stores, which were owned by public
universities throughout the country.
So within the first month and a half of the case, I made phone calls
to 80 some universities, and I got lots of phone calls from Attorney
Generals throughout the country. And because we were not able to
pay the amounts that were due under our contract, we were going to
* This is an edited version of the transcript from the second panel at the DEPAUL BUSINESS
AND COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL SYMPOSIUM, Old Code, New Code: Views on Bankruptcy from
the Bench and Bar, held on April 27, 2006.
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have to match up a buyer with a contract and ignore the RFP process
within each and every state.
So I got lots of angry phone calls from Attorney Generals, and I
said, "That's okay. If you don't participate in our process, we will just
do going-out-of-business sales at your university." I got most of their
attention except the Commonwealth of Virginia. The Commonwealth
of Virginia Attorney General back at the early stages of the case said,
"Ms. Lewis, we have sovereign immunity, so you can't come into
bankruptcy court and you can't force us to go into this process."
Again I said, "Okay. I understand what you are saying, however, I
will conduct a going-out-of-business sale at Virginia Military Institute
and all of your other universities." And eventually they cooperated in
the process.
I thought that would probably be the last time I heard about sover-
eign immunity in this case. It wasn't the last time. It was just the
beginning of the Commonwealth of Virginia's desire to assert sover-
eign immunity in the case. We ended up confirming a plan of reorgan-
ization, and we got a liquidating trustee appointed through the plan of
reorganization.
The liquidating trustee then worked with us to look at preference
payments and to receive all preference payments within 90 days
before bankruptcy. Given the fact that this was a company that oper-
ated college book stores throughout the United States, lots of those
preference payments went to colleges and universities. So in the Sixth
Circuit, which I reside and the case resided, we had the lovely Hood
decision that said sovereign immunity doesn't apply in bankruptcy.1
Great. I get to sue them.
So I sued them. And although I heard from a number of the Attor-
ney Generals, the only one to assert in a motion to dismiss sovereign
immunity was the Commonwealth of Virginia. And I remember going
to the bankruptcy hearing in front of Judge Howard. And William
Thro, who is from the Attorney General's Office, said to me, "I am
going to take this to the United States Supreme Court." I laughed at
him. I said, "You have the Hood decision in the Sixth Circuit."
At that point in time, Hood had just been accepted for cert before
the United States Supreme Court. I said, "You know, by the time we
get to that point in this case, the Hood decision will have been de-
cided, and either the Sixth Circuit is right or the Sixth Circuit is
wrong." So the process continued. Actually, in our case, I think it
1. In re Hood, 319 F.3d 755 (6th Cir. 2003), affd, Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541
U.S. 440 (2004).
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was at the district court level where the Court, basically, awaited to
get the decision from the United States Supreme Court on Hood
before it rendered a decision.
And for those of you who don't recall the Hood decision, it in-
volved a student loan discharge case. And the Sixth Circuit said that
Section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code was constitutional, and that you
could sue a state in bankruptcy court.2 And it went through a very
long historical analysis of the Federalist papers, et cetera, and it went
up to the Supreme Court on the issue of whether or not 106 of the
Bankruptcy Code is constitutional.
When it got up to the Supreme Court, I think it surprised everybody
in the bankruptcy community that they didn't decide whether it was
constitutional or not. Instead, the Supreme Court said, "You know,
this is a discharge case. This involves something very different than
going after a state for monetary damages. This involves the discharge
of an individual so, therefore, we aren't going to reach that issue, and
we are going to hold that it's - that part of bankruptcy, the discharge
is in Rem."
Okay. Well, what does that mean for me? Well, at that point it went
back - my case continued on, and it went to the Sixth Circuit. The
Sixth Circuit ruled like it did in the Hood decision, in a one-page opin-
ion saying, "We said this before in Hood." And then cert was filed in
the United States Supreme Court. I really, really did not believe the
United States Supreme Court was going to grant cert. They just had
this issue in front of them. They chose not to decide it. Why would
they take this case? Well, they did.
They accepted cert in April of '05. When they accepted cert, we
had a very different court than we have today. When they accepted
cert, Justice Rehnquist was there. Justice O'Connor had not an-
nounced her resignation. And I didn't know, really, what that meant
because, frankly, I hadn't ever done an in-depth study on sovereign
immunity throughout the United States because I didn't need to; I was
in the Sixth Circuit. Sovereign immunity really didn't get raised much
in the cases that I was involved in, so I really didn't do such an in-
depth study.
Cert was accepted. I was an absolute neophyte. I had never been
before the Supreme Court before. I didn't understand the significance
of this constitutional question at that time. But within 24 hours I did,
because I probably got 20 to 25 phone calls from practitioners and law
professors from all over the country; constitutional experts, United
2. Id. (discussing 11 U.S.C. § 106).
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States Supreme Court experts, all of which offered their services to
assist in the preparation and to argue the case before the Supreme
Court.
I contacted my client. I said, "You know what, this is a case I have
been involved in since day one. I know the most about the case, but
you need to know I am getting all these phone calls. Do you want me
to talk to these people about having somebody else come in to argue it
before the United States Supreme Court?" And he said, "Kim, you
know what, you have done a great job on this case. You know this
case like the back of your hand. You are the best person to do this
job. You make the decision on whether or not you want somebody to
help you on the briefs or you want somebody else to argue the case
before the Supreme Court. But I completely trust you."
Okay. So that's how we started the process in April. I brought in
some of my partners who - one who had practiced before the Su-
preme Court before, another who was a First Amendment lawyer, so
that might help on the constitutional side, and we decided that we
would bring in an expert to help us on the briefs.
So we interviewed a number of people and ultimately agreed on
Eric Brunstad, who is a professor at Yale and also a partner at Bing-
ham McCutchen, and he worked very closely with us. I soon realized
also in the beginning of the process of looking at this issue that the
Sixth Circuit really was in the minority. Every other circuit in the
country ruled that Section 106 was unconstitutional, and that would
have been, I think, five or six circuits.
And it soon became apparent to me that the Court's sole reason for
accepting the case was to reverse the Sixth Circuit. That's a pretty
daunting task ahead of you, especially for a neophyte like me who had
never been before the United States Supreme Court before. And,
frankly, I don't like history, and I am not a constitutional expert, but I
needed to learn very quickly. So we began the process of preparing
the briefs, because you have to file a brief long before the petitioner
files their brief, because it takes a very long process. And in this pro-
cess, I realized how important the bankruptcy community as a whole
was to this process.
We contacted a number of the amicus parties that were involved in
the Hood decision, and we worked with them. The professors submit-
ted an amicus brief in Hood. The same group of professors submitted
an amicus brief in our decision. And I think Professor Chemerinsky
- I don't know if he is here yet, but he is one of the professors who
will be here this afternoon. And we also contacted Bruce Mann, who
did the historical brief for the Hood decision, because you only have
[Vol. 4:555
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50 pages to express what you need to in an area like this, which was
incredibly difficult.
So we knew we needed a professor's brief and we knew we needed
an amicus brief on the history because we didn't have enough space in
our brief. Then we began the process of thinking about -- I started
looking at all the sovereign immunity cases having nothing to do with
bankruptcy. That was very scary. Ever since Rehnquist decided that
sovereign immunity was his baby, all of the decisions in the last 15 to
20 years were five-to-four decisions.
So I decided about and thought not only myself - like I said, this
was a joint effort by many people in the bankruptcy community, in-
cluding judges - Judge Haines from Arizona, who has written on this
topic, was a - I can't tell you how much he helped me through this
process. But we started talking about this: "You know, how are we
going to get through this? Let's look at the justices that are on the
court."
And you know exactly how they are going to line up because they
have lined up that way before. And the only chance you have is that
two justices who, potentially, are swing votes - they haven't been
swing votes on sovereign immunity, but maybe there's a chance at get-
ting at them, and that's Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy. We
started thinking, how are we going to brief this with Justice O'Connor
and Justice Kennedy in mind? Justice O'Connor loves in rem. And
the reason why she loves in rem is that she authored a number of
admiralty decisions that involved in rem. So we really liked the in rem
theory. Our problem with the in rem theory is there was a case called
Nordic Village that was decided by the United States Supreme Court
that said a preference action isn't in rem.3 Boy, how am I going to get
around that one?
So we thought about that, and we decided we were going to distin-
guish that because in that case, at least in the transcript of the pro-
ceeding and in the opinion of the Court, it appeared that the trustee
was seeking monetary relief as opposed to seeking the property back.
So that's what we did. We distinguished Nordic Village, and we
wanted to make the in rem argument because Justice O'Connor loved
in rem.
Justice Kennedy. What did Justice Kennedy like? He authored a
constitutional opinion called Coeur d'Alene4, and in that opinion,
what was very clear to us is that he believed in that case that alterna-
3. United States v. Nordic Viii., Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992).
4. Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
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tive remedies are important; that there's got to be an alternative rem-
edy. And that's why in Coeur d'Alene he felt very comfortable in
saying sovereign immunity applied.
Well, that's a good thing because in bankruptcy there is no alterna-
tive remedy. The trustee sues in bankruptcy court. They can't go to
state court. They can't go anywhere else, so there's no alternative
remedy. So we decided to come up with theories that didn't exist for
us in the Sixth Circuit or, I should say, we didn't argue in the Sixth
Circuit because we didn't need to. We already had the Hood decision.
So we decided to argue waiver because in this case, one of the Com-
monwealth's institutions, the Virginia Military Institute, had filed a
proof of claim. None of the other ones did, but one of them did. So
we said, "Okay, waiver." Number two, in rem. Number three - this
was the nice new innovative argument that kind of played into who
Justice Kennedy is. This is a bankruptcy trustee. He is a federal en-
tity. That's very different than an individual, a private citizen suing
the United States Government. And the reason, again, why we
wanted to put that in there is because we wanted to show the Court
how bankruptcy was different. So that was our third argument.
And our fourth argument was the uniformity clause. I loved the
uniformity clause. Every time I read about it, I got more into it. But
every time I read about it and got more into it, I knew it was a loser
because I was looking at the court that was there in April. Well, in
June the petitioner filed their brief. Three days later Justice
O'Connor announced her resignation. Oh, my gosh, now what are we
going to do? Justice O'Connor, one of our swing votes, is potentially
going to be gone by the time we argue this case.
All right. So our brief is due in August, but we still have to count
on the fact that Justice O'Connor is, maybe, going to be there, because
we don't know who the replacement is, other than Chief Justice Rob-
erts had been nominated. We thought he would probably go through,
but we weren't for sure, so we had to still hope that we have to play to
Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor because, again, you can't per-
suade the other ones. You already know how they are going to vote.
So we submitted our brief in the beginning of August. And, liter-
ally, about a week after our brief was submitted, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist died. What does this mean? Well, that became apparent fairly
quickly thereafter. Chief Justice Roberts was going to be taking over
Chief Justice Rehnquist's position, or at least be nominated to take
over Chief Justice Rehnquist's position. Now we have another open-
ing with Justice O'Connor.
[Vol. 4:555
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My argument was scheduled for Halloween, October 31. As the
end of September neared, the beginning of October, Chief Justice
Roberts was confirmed. Okay. Now I know that we got Chief Justice
Roberts. I counted him as he was going to rule just exactly like Justice
Rehnquist ruled, so I didn't think that really changed my dynamics
too much. But President Bush didn't take too long before he came
out with a nominee for Justice O'Connor, which was Harriet Miers. I
don't think I pronounced that correctly. That was the beginning of
October.
By about the third week of October, a week before my argument, it
became apparent that she was no longer going to be the nominee. So
now, again, we don't have anybody to be appointed by Justice
O'Connor. So I don't know whether Justice O'Connor is going to
hear my case or not hear my case, and whether she will be there when
the decision gets rendered. So I am prepping, and the other thing that
I had no idea is what does it take to prepare for a Supreme Court
argument.
As I said before, I am not a history major. I know very little about
history. I spent so much time reading Bruce Mann's book. I spent so
much time reading a lot of history about preferences, about the Bank-
ruptcy Code, about English bankruptcy law; something I never really
thought I would do.
Then you have to read about the justices. So I read Justice Scalia's
book. I read Justice Breyer's book. And as I told you before, I read
every sovereign immunity decision that existed in the last 20 years, but
then I had to go back to all the prior ones. So you spend a lot of time
reading and prepping, and then you have to prepare for the reports.
And in the middle of this, I am actually doing another case. I was
counsel for Huffy Corporation in their restructuring. Well, they
emerged from bankruptcy on October 15. My argument was October
31. So I was in the closing of the Huffy case two weeks before my
Supreme Court argument. So I literally left the closing table from
Huffy to go to Washington, D.C. for my first moot court, which was at
the Public Citizens in Washington. And the justices, fake justices that
we used, were some of the people from Public Citizens as well as a
number of professors. Professor Chemerinsky was one of them.
Judge Haines was another one of the justices. And we had a number
of other people who served as my justices. I started out that moot
court by talking about waiver, because I thought that was our strong-
est way of winning this case. And so I went through the entire moot
court and - I'm sorry. Actually, I started that one with the uniform-
ity argument. I got through the moot court, and the justices said to
2006]
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me, "Kim, you know, that's your weakest argument. Why do you
want to start out with that?" I said, "That's why they accepted cert."
They said, "Yes, but you made three other arguments in your brief,
and you know that's your weakest argument, so don't start out with
that."
Okay. Going back to the drawing board. I now have a week and a
half before my next moot court, which is in Georgetown. My Ge-
orgetown moot court is the Thursday before my Supreme Court ap-
pearance the following Monday. So I go back to the office and prep
for my next moot court, and I go to Georgetown. At Georgetown I
had as my justices a number of former law clerks for Supreme Court
justices and a few professors, and it was a great session. I mean, I got
through it and answered all the questions. And afterwards they
looked at me and they said, "Why did you start with waiver?" I said,
"Well, I started with the uniformity clause before. And they said,
"You know, the thing that we are struggling with is you are a bank-
ruptcy lawyer, and you know a lot about bankruptcy, and your theo-
ries in your brief are that bankruptcy is different. And all those
justices on the Supreme Court, they are constitutional experts, and
you are never going to know as much as those justices on the Supreme
Court about constitution, but you know more than those justices on
the Supreme Court about bankruptcy. So if you are going to win this
case, the only way you are going to win this case is demonstrating that
bankruptcy is different."
So I left there, and I had already decided that I had been - I was in
Washington now on Thursday, and I was not going to leave until after
the Supreme Court case. I had lots of family coming in from all over
and friends coming in from all over, and I had my husband and chil-
dren promise me that - they actually were staying at another hotel.
No one was allowed to speak to me until after the Supreme Court
argument. They could all walk over with me, but that was about it.
So I was holed up in the room, and I actually had an associate with
me that I could send e-mails to on my Blackberry and say, "I need you
to research this, find this case." We would meet once a day, and he
would bring me the cases that I asked him to look at. We spent 15
minutes together just talking, and then I would go back to my room.
My parents actually checked into the same hotel I was staying in,
and that was Sunday night. And my father told me later that when he
checked in, the woman at the front desk said, "Oh, you are related to
that woman on the fifth floor. Well, the maids don't go in that room,
and they haven't been in there since Thursday." And my dad said,
[Vol. 4:555
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"Well, that would probably be Kim. She hasn't left there since Thurs-
day." So that was my life for about five days.
And then it was actually walking over to the Supreme Court the
morning of. And all I can - for those of you who have never argued
before the Supreme Court - of course, I don't think I ever will again
- it was a very frightening experience. I had actually gone to see
arguments three weeks before then so I wouldn't be in total awe when
I walked in. And I walked in the building. And you get checked in in
a special area, and you go up to the attorneys' lounge, and they give
you the speech about, "Now, you really shouldn't call them by the
wrong name, but you really should say Justice O'Connor and Mr.
Chief Justice, and - if you can remember their name. But if you
forget, don't use the wrong name."
So that was right before, and I was the second case. They have two
cases a day. And the first case is the 10:00 o'clock case, and the sec-
ond case is the 11:00 o'clock case. And when you are the 11:00 o'clock
case, you have to be there for the 10:00 o'clock case. You are just at
the backup counsel table. And they let you come into the Supreme
Court and check the podium and see how high it is compared to where
you would stand.
And so we came in about 9:30 and, you know, of course, the justices
aren't there and, you know, you are adjusting the podium to see how
it fits. And, again, it's very scary. If this is the podium, the justices are
a little bit higher than eye level. But if you see where Judge Waldron
is, that's how close the justices are, and that's pretty intimidating.
So we started out by - I am at the backup table. And the first case
comes in, and it's an antitrust case. And the first lawyer gets up and
starts arguing, and Justice Breyer is just in one of those moods, and he
is just reaming this guy, and - not at first. I mean, at first he asks him
a question, two questions, and the lawyer couldn't answer the ques-
tion, at least not the way Justice Breyer wanted him to answer the
question. So it got worse, and it got worse. And I am thinking, "Oh,
my gosh." And then Justice Scalia started to go after him, and I am
thinking, "This is not going to be a lot of fun."
The case is over. What happens is the table in front of you gets up,
leaves, the justices stay up there, and you just pick up your stuff, and
you move to the table in front of you. I was lucky I was the Respon-
dent, so I didn't have to get up first. The Petitioner got up first, and
William Thro got up as the Attorney General for the Commonwealth.
And he started out, and he actually got in more words than I did to
begin with.
2006]
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And Justice O'Connor was his first question. And Justice
O'Connor asked him, "How often are states' creditors in bank-
ruptcy?" And I am thinking, "Oh, I like this line of questioning."
And then she continued on to questions about in rem. And I am
thinking, "This is great." And, again, you know, I am taking notes as
he's up there, and what the justices are looking for and asking for.
And Justice Scalia, of course, is on his side. So Justice Scalia was try-
ing to get him to answer the question that preferences aren't any dif-
ferent than contract claims.
He didn't really answer that like that, and he didn't - he could
have really said that preferences, just like contract claims, aren't prop-
erty in the state in bankruptcy. But he didn't go to that argument, and
he didn't even mention that. He comes to me, and I get up. And I got
one sentence out, and the Chief Justice interrupted me and said, "Ms.
Lewis, how can you distinguish this case from the Florida Prepaid
case?"
For those of you who don't know sovereign immunity, the Florida
Prepaid case is a patent case under Article 1.5 And I started to argue
because I didn't want to go into the uniformity argument immediately,
because I knew that I was going to be going down a bad road with
that. I said that, "Well, in the Patent Prepaid case there was an alter-
native remedy." And, you know, I saw Justice Kennedy's eyes light
up a bit.
Then Justice Souter - he is one of my friends. I mean, he is going
to rule in my favor no matter what. Justice Souter said, "Ms. Lewis, I
like your theory about there being an alternative remedy, but where is
the exception in sovereign immunity that there has to be an alterna-
tive remedy?" He says, "You know how I would like to rule in this
case, but I don't know how I can find that sovereign immunity doesn't
apply if there's no alternative remedy."
And so, basically, once we got into a rapport with questions with
him, we finally decide that my alternative remedy theory was that
bankruptcy was different under the uniformity clause and that the uni-
formity clause made it different, and that's why there was no alterna-
tive remedy.
And, again, you know, you can get out, literally, two sentences
before you get barraged by questions all over the place. About half-
way through my argument, Justice Ginsburg is asking me a procedural
question on my waiver argument, then all of a sudden, boom, there's
5. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999)
(construing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4).
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this loud noise. Justice Ginsburg jumped. The marshals flew up to the
front of the courtroom, and a light bulb exploded over Justice Gins-
burg's head. Everybody in the courtroom thought it was a shot. So
did I.
It felt like it took ten minutes, but I know it was just seconds until
the Chief Justice said, "I think it's just a light bulb that exploded."
And then he went on to make a joke about this is a joke that they are
playing on the new Chief Justice. And Justice Scalia said, "Happy
Halloween," and everybody started laughing. And Justice Kennedy
looked at me and just - he just whispered to me - he said, "Take
your time. We are interested."
All of the justices, I think, felt very sorry for me. Here I am, a
brand new person to argue before the Supreme Court. By the way,
they know that. They check you out long before you come up and
argue before them. They knew I had never argued a case before the
Supreme Court. And I think that when the light bulb exploded, it
kind of broke any kind of nervousness that I had previously had. And
Justice Ginsburg was absolutely amazing, because she jumped back
into the question that she had and just continued on.
And after that, I finished up my argument. I saw my white light go
on, and there wasn't any questioning going on. I figured I would make
my conclusion and I would sit down. The alternative was you start
getting into another argument. And the new Chief Justice, if you ever
argue before the Supreme Court, does not let you go beyond the red
light. When that red light goes on, he will stop you, and you will sit
down. So I knew I had very little time, so I made my conclusion, and I
sat down.
After we finished, and Mr. Thro got up, and he was questioned by
Justice Stevens, and Justice Stevens actually started asking him ques-
tions about the plan on the convention. And I thought, I can't believe
that's where this case is going to ultimately go.
This was, again, October 31. So we left. It was the most amazing
experience I have ever had. And I thought, you know what, this was a
great experience. I did the best that I could do. I worked really hard,
and I know I couldn't have done any better. And the briefs were in
the argument. But I knew the likelihood of winning is pretty slim, and
maybe I will win on waiver. Maybe I will win on some alternative
remedy, but I did the best I could do.
We left, and probably every day I checked on the United States
Supreme Court web site to see what decisions got rendered on that
particular day. And on January 23 I got a phone call at 9:30 in the
morning; the United States Supreme Court on the phone. "Ms.
2006]
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Lewis? Yes. This is the clerk of the United States Supreme Court.
Yes. The Katz decision has just been handed down, and it has been
upheld by a 5-4 decision. Justice Stevens authored the opinion." She
continued to tell me who voted on what side. I just listened. And
then she said, "And we will be e-mailing you the decision within a few
minutes, and it will be made available for the public this afternoon,
but you will get it via e-mail in a few minutes."
I hung up the phone, and I was just in shock. And I got the e-
mailed decision. And I don't know how many of you have read the
decision, but it was written by Justice Stevens. The decision was an-
nounced on January 23 because Justice Stevens was sick that day. Jus-
tice O'Connor actually got to announce the decision from the bench
on January 23, which was her very last day on the bench, and her very
last swing vote decision was the Katz decision, in which she voted with
the liberal justices in the case.6 And Justice Stevens' opinion couldn't
be any better for bankruptcy practitioners, except for states if they are
in bankruptcy.
It basically goes down the "plan on the convention" analysis and
also adds the in rem flavor to it, because that's the only way they
would have gotten Justice O'Connor's vote. And there's one particu-
lar footnote in the decision that I always point everybody to. They
say, "Well, why do you think you won this case?" And I always say,
"Well, look at Footnote 9 in the opinion." And I think that's exactly
why Justice O'Connor went for it. There is a sentence in the middle of
it that says, "Indeed, the bankruptcy clause's unique history combined
with the singular nature of bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction have per-
suaded us that the ratification of the bankruptcy clause does represent
a surrender by the states of their sovereign immunity in certain federal
proceedings." 7
And I believe that Justice O'Connor believed that bankruptcy was
different. And that's why bankruptcy is different. And there have
been a lot of people who have said, well, it's almost like bankruptcy is
like the 14th Amendment now, because that's the only thing that's an
exception to the sovereign immunity of being able to sue the states.
And it was a great victory. It was a lot of fun. I really enjoyed it,
looking back on it. I was terrified at the time. And I couldn't be more
thankful for having such a wonderful experience and, certainly, having
such a great victory. Thank you.
6. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990 (2006).
7. Id. at 1000 n.9 (2006).
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